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How to Save the National Priorities
List from the D.C. Circuit and
Itself
JOHN S. APPLEGATE*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA or "Superfund")' seeks to require
those who are responsible for creating hazardous waste sites to
clean them up. CERCLA combines two very different strategies
to accomplish this goal. The process for deciding who shall pay for
the clean-up is an innovative adaptation of traditional civil litiga-
tion and tort law concepts of strict, joint and several, and vicari-
ous liability. In contrast, the process for deciding which sites need
to be cleaned up, how to clean them, and how clean they must be
made follows familiar models of administrative decision making.
Because the liability part of CERCLA is so radical in its
approach and creates such a broad group of highly exposed re-
sponsible parties, the liability issues have been the target of most
controversy and the focus of most reform efforts. Senator Max S.
Baucus recently took a different position. Baucus believes that the
liability system works reasonably well; the problem with
Superfund is the byzantine, interminable, and incredibly expensive
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; B.A., 1978, Haverford College; J.D.,
1981, Harvard University. Brad Mank provided helpful suggestions, and Tad LeVan pro-
vided able research assistance.
' Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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clean-up process.' I agree. While it has taken time and the mid-
course correction of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)' for the law of potentially
responsible party (PRP) liability to gain some stability, that is
hardly a disturbing portrait of a "common law" system for flesh-
ing out the details of general statutory language. The regulatory
side of CERCLA has no such excuse. What appears a perfectly
rational decisionmaking process has become a rigid, time-consum-
ing, and hugely expensive parade of documents, objections, and
litigation.
This Article considers the National Priorities List (NPL) and
its fate at the hands of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The NPL is an announcement from
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), near the beginning
of the clean-up process, that certain hazardous waste sites are
likely to require clean-up, and of the sites' relative dangerousness.
I will argue that the statutory structure of CERCLA, its bureau-
cratic implementation, and its judicial mistreatment have com-
bined to focus enormous resources on the decisionmaking steps
along the way, instead of on the actual clean-up. This has contrib-
uted substantially to the embarrassingly unproductive and horren-
dously expensive system whose reauthorization is now before
Congress.
Part I of the Article examines the statutorily mandated
clean-up process to show how the statute itself creates the prob-
lem. Part II reviews the D.C. Circuit's record of reversal of NPL
listing decisions and its effect on CERCLA decisionmaking. Part
III offers some suggestions for reform.
I. THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST IN CLEAN-UP DECISION
MAKING
The regulatory side of CERCLA - the process for deciding
which sites need to be cleaned up, clean-up methods, and the de-
gree of clean-up - follows the traditional regulatory model in
which the agency (in this case EPA) gathers and analyzes rele-
vant data and after public comment makes a decision which is
Superfund: Clean-Up Standards. Not Liability Scheme, Should Lead Changes to
Law, Baucus Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1134 (Oct. 15, 1993).
' Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 1-531, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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subject to judicial review. This Part first outlines the clean-up pro-
cess. It then turns to detailed consideration of the role of the NPL
in the regulatory decisionmaking process and the effect of the ex-
isting statuory restrictions on judicial review.
A. The Overall Process
CERCLA makes EPA's National Contingency Plan (NCP)
the blueprint of the entire clean-up process. It sets the standards
for clean-up, as well as the process by which clean-up decisions
are to be made.4 The NCP system bears all the hallmarks of the
traditional regulatory process,5 in which the agency first identifies
problems in terms of statutory criteria, sets priorities among the
problems it has identified, chooses an appropriate response, and
enforces (or implements) that response.
Identification of the problem. The process begins with the
discovery and initial evaluation of a site. A site can be identified
in any number of ways: governmental inspection, CERCLA re-
lease reporting,' a citizen's request for a site assessment of a re-
lease or threatened release of a hazardous substance,7 or receipt of
other information." All sites are entered in the CERCLA Infor-
mation System (CERCLIS). A preliminary assessment (PA)
based on existing information (visual inspection and documentary
research) is performed for all CERCLIS sites - now numbering
in excess of 30,000 - to determine whether further investigation
4 See 42 U.S.C. §9605(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1992). The NCP was originally
created in 1968 as a plan for responding to oil spills under the Clean Water Act. This plan,
along with the Clean Water Act's liability scheme, was adopted in CERCLA. SARA man-
dated a number of important changes to the NCP which were incorporated in the 1990
version. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed.
Reg. 8666 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300). For thorough overviews of the 1988
proposal and the 1990 revisions, see Joseph Freedman, Proposed Amendments to the Na-
tional Contingency Plan: Explanation and Analysis, [19 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envil. L. Inst.) 10103 (1989); Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National Contingency
Plan-More Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, [20 News & Analysis]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10222 (1990).
' See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory
Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 306-07 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Worst Things First]; see also John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk:
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 261,
267, 285-94 (1991) [hereinafter Unreasonable Risk].
' See, e.g., CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988).
See, e.g., CERCLA § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1988).
' See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.405 (1992).
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is needed. If so, a site investigation (SI) is conducted to deter-
mine, among other things, whether a removal action is required.
The SI involves the collection of more data, including sampling of
waste and environmental media. 9 The PA and SI screen out sites
are unlikely to require a clean-up. 10
Setting priorities. The PA and SI gather the full range of
risk information, though not in great detail, including the history
of the site, the nature and quantities of hazardous material
thought to be present, and the vectors of potential human expo-
sure." These data are then applied to the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem (HRS), a scoring system used to evaluate the relative risk of
potential clean-up sites. The HRS assigns a value between 0 and
100 to the site based on the amounts and toxic characteristics of
the hazardous substances present, the routes of actual and poten-
tial human exposure (soil, air, groundwater, and surface water),
and the distance to, and size of, the affected population."' The
risk values for all of the routes of exposure are weighted and
added and a total score is calculated. That the HRS measures
only relative risk is nicely illustrated by the choice of 28.5 as the
listing threshold. There is no intrinsic reason for this value; it was
originally chosen solely because it resulted in 400 sites being
placed on the first list."
The NPL is what it sounds like: a list of sites, generally
ranked by HRS value," that require response action. While it is
not a legal prerequisite to private clean-up activity, to abatement
actions for imminent hazards, or to recovery of response costs,
listing is required for governmental clean-up activity and recovery
I See 40 C.F.R. § 300.410 (1992). The PA and SI phases are described in more de-
tail in the preamble to the final rule revising the Hazard Ranking System. See Hazard
Ranking System, 55 Fed. Reg. 51532, 51540 (1990). See also Ragna Henrichs,
Superfund's NPL: The Listing Process, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. RE'v. 717, 729-37 (1989).
1" See 55 Fed. Reg. 51532, 51540 (1990).
" See 40 C.F.R. § 300.420 (1992).
" See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 908-11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Eagle-Picher 1] (describing the HRS). The HRS is codified as Appendix A to the
NCP. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1992). For a history and more detailed description of
the HRS, see Henrichs, supra note 9. at 729-737; Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assess-
ment in the Federal Government: Trying to Understand the Process, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L. J.
45 (1991). The HRS was most recently revised in 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 51532 (1990).
" See Steven J. Haness & John T. Warwick, Evaluating the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem, 32 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 165, 166-67 (1991).
" The listing process is set out at 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (1992). The list itself is Ap-
pendix B to the NCP. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1992).
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of costs from the Superfund itself.15 Except at federally owned
sites, listing does not mean that remedial action must follow.
While the HRS is the primary means for adding sites to the NPL,
sites can also be added at a state's requestO or because EPA finds
an immediate endangerment to public health." The listing pro-
cess is procedurally an elaborate rulemaking adding a lengthy
comment period and a requirement that EPA respond to com-
ments to the regular notice-and-comment procedures. 8 As of July
1993, 1270 sites were listed or proposed for listing on the NPL. 19
Choosing a remedy. All sites on the NPL are also subject to
a health assessment by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Dis-
ease Registry (ATSDR). 0 This assessment is to be a "preliminary
assessment of the potential risk to human health" based on toxic-
ity and exposure data, using risk assessments and other tools.2"
The health assessment assists in the preparation of the site reme-
dial investigation (RI).22 The RI, which begins the remedial
phase proper, defines the nature and extent of contamination and
undertakes a baseline risk assessment.21 The RI is usually linked
to the feasibility study (FS).24 This document adopts a risk level
as a "preliminary remediation goal," and it develops and evaluates
alternative remedial actions capable of achieving that goal.25 As
11 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1992). This aspect of the NCP, which is not re-
quired by the statute, was upheld in Ohio v. USEPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Listing has two minor legal consequences: technical assistance grants to citizens
groups are made only for NPL sites, see, e.g., CERCLA § 118(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)
(1988); and listing triggers the remedial process and application of state law federal facili-
ties. See, e.g., CERCLA §§ 117(e), 120(a)(4)(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9616(e), 9620(a)(4)(e)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11 CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(B) requires the addition of the single highest priority site
identified by any state. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(3) (1992).
18 See Henrichs, supra note 9, at 727-28.
'9 See, e.g., Karen Breslin, In Our Own Backyards: The Continuing Threat of Haz-
ardous Waste, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 484, 484 (1993).
10 CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1988).
ATSDR is one of the Centers of Disease Control. It was created by CERCLA. See CER-
CLA § 104 (i)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1988).
21 CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(F) (1988 & Supp. IV 1988).
22 CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(D)-(H), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(D)-(H). See generally En-
vironmental Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, 763
F. Supp. 1576, 1581-82 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (describing health assessment process and noting
that it is tentative and advisory only).
92 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a), .430(d) (1992); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8709-11 (1990).
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a), .430(c) (1992); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8711-12 (1990).
20 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e) (1992).
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part of this process, the alternatives identified in the FS are evalu-
ated against criteria derived from the statute and described in the
NCP 6 A remedy must meet the so-called threshold criteria
(overall protection of health and compliance with other laws); the
other NCP criteria (including cost and long- and short-term effec-
tiveness) may be traded off against each other."'
From among the alternatives, the preferred remedy and the
justification for it become the proposed plan (PP), which is dis-
cussed with the state and is subject to public comment.28 Public
reactions, the "modifying criteria," go into EPA's final decision,
which is memorialized in a record of decision (ROD).2 The ROD
responds to public comments, explains EPA's choice of remedy,
defines the goals of clean-up, and specifies long-term monitoring. 0
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii) (1992), derived from CERCLA § 121(b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (a SARA addition).
The criteria are:
Threshold
* overall protection of health and the environment,
* compliance with ARARs and other laws,
Balancing
" long-term effectiveness,





" state acceptance, and
" community acceptance.
Id.
27 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(i) (1992). There are other substantive directions in
CERCLA and the NCP. The statutory preference for permanent solutions means that
those balancing factors will receive most emphasis. See 40 C.F.R § 300.430 (f)(I)(ii)(E)
(1992); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8725 (1990). Moreover, there is a clear preference for remedies
that treat waste, instead of isolating untreated waste. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(I)(ii)(e)
(1992); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8721 (1990). The NCP even establishes "management princi-
ples" to structure remedies (into operable units permitting early action) and "expectations"
for types of remedies that will be adopted at most sites, though of course each particular
site may be different. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(l)(ii)-(iii) (1992). EPA also sought to struc-
ture more carefully the role of cost in its deliberations, by giving it a specific place and
limited function in the balancing process. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (f)(1)(ii)(D) (1992). It can
also be used to screen out alternatives where "grossly excessive" costs are involved. 40
C.F.R. § 300.430 (e)(7)(iii) (1992). There are limits to the extent to which EPA can be
clear on this since the statute itself is delphic on this point requiring both permanent solu-
tions and cost-effectiveness. CERCLA § 121(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1992). See
generally The 1990 National Contingency Plan, supra note 4, at 10,237-41.
U CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992).
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(i) (1992).
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(5) (1992).
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Enforcement or implementation. It should be emphasized
that none of the foregoing makes any physical difference to the
hazardous waste site. Before spade hits dirt, the remedial plan in
the ROD is further developed in the remedial design and remedial
action (RD/RA) phase."1 Significant changes in the final remedial
plan require revision of the ROD and a published explanation."
Then the site is actually cleaned up. After completion of the re-
medial work, EPA turns the site over to state supervision for oper-
ations and maintenance ss and reviews the site for recategorization
and ultimately delisting from the NPL.
34
B. Priority Setting in CERCLA
Priority setting plays an unusually important role in CER-
CLA decision making, and the implementation and judicial review
of the NPL share no small part of the blame for CERCLA's defi-
ciencies. This phenomenon can be traced to two statutory factors:
(1) the structure and substance of CERCLA have elevated prior-
ity setting from a system of internal management to a goal in it-
self (the subject of this section), and (2) listing has become an
outlet for obtaining judicial review in a scheme that is otherwise
notable for its absence (the subject of section C). As a result, the
NPL and HRS are the focus of much critical attention in the cur-
rent reauthorization debate, and may be abolished altogether.3 5
1. Disparity of Goals and Resources
Because Congressional aspirations always exceed regulatory
resources, priority setting is always an integral part of environ-
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.435 (1992).
2 CERCLA § 117(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(c) (1992).
13 CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1 CERCLA § 121(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.425(e) (1992).
" See, e.g., Superfund: Administration Refines Position on Reform; Recommenda-
tions Expected Soon, Sources Say, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1515, 1516 (Dec. 17, 1993);
Superfund: Overhaul of Remedy Selection Process, Some Municipal Liability Sought by
EPA, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1228 (Nov. 5, 1993); Superfund." Greater State Role, National
Standards Advocated by EPA. Agency Official Testifies, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1229, 1230
(Nov. 5, 1993). A more elaborate proposal would replace the NPL with two lists: a state
created priorities list and a National Funding List for orphan (and recalcitrant PRP) sites.
See Superfund: NACEPT Panel Offers Position Papers with Draft Options on Superfund
Reform, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1132 (Oct. 15, 1993). The Administration's bill is described
in the text accompanying notes 120-122.
1993-941
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
mental control schemes.6 This function is even more crucial in
CERCLA because of the unusually large disparity between what
the statute wants to accomplish and the resources available to ac-
complish it. The statutory predicate for taking action - a release
or threatened release of a small quantity of any of a large number
of hazardous substances - implicates a huge number of sites,
while the targeted clean-up standards for each site are extremely
stringent.3 7 In terms of the above phases of the regulatory process,
CERCLA identifies many problems and demands very ambitious
remedies; therefore, priority setting - which mediates between
the two - assumes great significance. Congress expressly recog-
nized this disparity in drafting the statute, which is why, unlike
other resource-poor environmental statutes, CERCLA includes an
explicit provision for priority setting.38 The statute makes it
"abundantly plain that EPA is required to serve as the protector
and distributor of scarce government resources devoted to this
program." 39
The NPL serves three purposes in the statute. First, it is a
threshold test or screening device for the expenditure of public
monies, both remedial administration and the Superfund.40 While
it is not a prerequisite to private cost recovery, NPL listing is re-
quired before the Superfund can be used. The NPL process also
assures that a health assessment has been completed and that a
certain risk level has been reached before public clean-up re-
sources are used. Second, it is a detailed internal management tool
for rationally allocating scarce resources after the threshold level
has been met. Without a coherent priority setting system, a regu-
lator can lose focus, lack direction, diffuse effort, and expend re-
sources unproductively.4 1 Third, the NPL informs EPA itself of
the relative degree of concern of various sites and it provides the
' See Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 287-89.
For a more detailed description of this terminology, see id. at 305-07.
8 See S. REP. No. 848. 96TH CONG., 2D SESS 17-19, 59 (1980).
3 Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40 See Hazard Ranking System (HRS) for Uncontrolled Hazardous Substance Re-
leases, 53 Fed. Reg. 51962, 51963 (1988) (proposed HRS); Ohio, 838 F.2d at 1331.




public with important information about the existence and status
of hazardous waste sites."'
2. Statutory Attention
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that the NPL and
HRS receive so much attention in the statute itself. CERCLA
sets out guidance for the creation of and ranking within the NPL.
It specifies general criteria such as risk, environmental damage,
and exposure, as well as particular criteria such as effects on the
food chain, drinking water supplies, and combustion waste." The
HRS is formally sanctioned by the statute. It was not mentioned
(because it did not exist) in the 1980 CERCLA, but the 1986
SARA required EPA to make a number of specific amendments
to it. The most important is that the HRS "to the maximum ex-
tent feasible, [assure] that the hazard ranking system accurately
assesses the relative degree of risk to human health and the envi-
ronment posed by sites and facilities."" The Congressional con-
cern for accuracy can be overstated, however. The apparently gen-
eral interest in the accuracy of the HRS45 was in reality aimed at
its high ranking of mining wastes.46 The SARA conference report
noted that the HRS need not be "equivalent to detailed risk
assessments.',
7
CERCLA's interest in priority setting is all the more striking
when compared with other environmental statutes. Priority setting
typically is a purely internal process for EPA to allocate its scarce
resources, done with little Congressional guidance and less judicial
interference. Even where Congress has recognized the problem of
priorities and the courts have been drawn into priority setting, the
"' See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47912, 47931 (1985); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 919-22 (D.C. Cir
1985); see also Bradley Mining Co. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
" CERCLA §9 105(a)(8), 118, 125, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605 (a)(8), 9618, 9625 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
" CERCLA § 105(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992) (empha-
sis added). SARA also required EPA to give special attention to the surface water contam-
ination. CERCLA § 105(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
"' See HR REP. No. 253. 99TH CONG., IST SESS. pt. 1, at 71-73 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2853-55; S. REP No. 11, 99TH CONG.. 1ST SEss. 40-44 (1985).
40 See Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA. 938 F.2d 1299, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing the legislative history). "Our review of the legislative history reveals no other congres-
sional concerns about the fairness of the original HRS." Id.
"' See HR. CONF REP. No. 962. 99TH CONG.. 2D SEss. 200 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3293.
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legislative direction has been very general and the judicial review
correspondingly deferential. The Occupational Safety and Health
Act, for example, reserves the agency's power to set its own priori-
ties,48 and cases interpreting the OSH Act have at most required
the agency to explain its decision to pursue or to defer a particular
issue.49 Other priority setting recognized by statute, such as the
Interagency Testing Committee list in the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 50 is so purely advisory as to be practically immune from
judicial enforcement. The relative flood of statutory and adminis-
trative ink devoted to the NPL and HRS combines with the accu-
racy language to create an environment in which the priority set-
ting process becomes an end in itself (employing a whole set of
bureaucratic procedures and goals), instead of an early and tenta-
tive step in a much larger decision making process leading to ac-
tual clean-up.
3. Regulatory Rationalism
The underlying reason for the attention given the NPL and
HRS is that the entire structure of the NCP is an exercise in an
approach to administrative decisionmaking known as comprehen-
sive rationality.51 The idea of comprehensive rationality is to de-
velop a synoptic system that will take account of all relevant as-
pects of a problem, fully analyze them, and come to the best
solution. Classically stated, this proceeds in four stages: specifica-
tion of goals, identification of all reasonable alternatives to achieve
those goals, analysis of all alternatives, and selection of the alter-
native that will make the most progress toward the goals. The
48 29 U.S.C. § 655(g)(1988).
,9 See, e.g., National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d
882, 888-90 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (El Congreso III); National Congress of Hispanic American
Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196, 1198- 200 (D.C. Cit. 1977)(El Congreso II), reversing
National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Dunlop, 425 F. Supp. 900, 902
(D.D.C. 1975) (El Congreso 1); cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (up-
holding FDA's exercise of discretion not to pursue states' arguably illegal use of prescrip-
tion drugs for executions). These cases are discussed in more detail in Worst Things First,
supra note 5, at 338-42.
" 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1988).
See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 396-401, 413-21 (1981); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "'Muddling
Through," 19 PuB. AiMIN. REV. 79 (1959); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis
and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1253-58 (1987). There is a large amount
of public administration literature, much of it of great interest to regulatory lawyers, elabo-
rating upon and responding to Lindblom.
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NCP's process for remedy selection matches the comprehensive
model exactly: The FS establishes clean-up goals at individual
sites by reference to nine criteria and data gathered in the RI.
The FS also identifies a range of remedial alternatives which are
analyzed in terms of the technical criteria; the preferred alterna-
tive then is identified in the PP. Final remedy selection in the
ROD is based on EPA's evaluation of all of the relevant statutory
criteria.
In theory, this process makes perfect sense. It establishes a
clear relationship between statutory goals and administrative ac-
tion, identifies information that is used and that is unavailable,
and allows for technical policy management.52 Comprehensive ra-
tionality is also a good way to approach problems in a proactive
way, to keep an eye on the big picture, to develop long-term co-
herent strategies, and to be able rationally to allocate scarce re-
sources.53 In practice, too, a thoughtful planner would go through
the steps of gathering information, identifying alternatives, evalu-
ating them, and finally choosing the best one."" The problem oc-
curs when the decisionmaking process itself becomes rigid and
each otherwise logical step becomes both a set of information de-
mands and an end in itself. It is natural for bureaucracies to
fasten upon defined stages of a project to measure accomplish-
ment (a current term is "milestones"), especially since actual
clean-up is too hard to measure and too long-term to use to evalu-
ate bureaucratic productivity. The stages set out under CERCLA
can be such milestones, and the lavishly detailed NPL makes a
particularly good one. If a measure of productivity is document
generation (e.g., PAs, SIs, HRSs, RIs, FSs, RODs) then listing
will take on a life of its own. Professor McGarity has recently
decried the "ossification" of rulemaking by, among other things,
the imposition of statutory requirements for comprehensive
analysis. 5
02 See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY THE ROLE OF REGULA-
TORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 112-23 (1991).
11 See Bruce Adams, The Limitations of Muddling Through: Does Anyone in Wash-
ington Really Think Anymore?, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 545 (1979).
64 Thus, knowledgeable reformers endorse the basic decision making process but call
for more flexibility. See, e.g., CLEAN SITES, IMPROVING REMEDY SELECTION: AN EXPLICIT
AND INTERACTIVE PROCESS FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM (1990).
*0 Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying'" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992).
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The NPL and HRS implicate another important aspect of
the rationalist approach in that they are quantitative, and regula-
tory rationalism emphasizes quantification as a way of objecti-
fying the decisionmaking process." EPA increasingly uses quanti-
fiable risk as the basis for its regulatory policy and requirements
in all of its programs." Quantitative risk assessment - - assigning
numerical values to toxicity and exposure - is central to the en-
tire process, from the initial analysis of sites and health assess-
ments,58 to determining clean-up levels. The HRS creates the
NPL by giving a quantitative risk value to sites. It is a simplified
version of quantitative risk assessment,5 ' the current method of
choice in regulation of toxic substances, and it is viewed as "a
method to objectively evaluate the danger posed by a hazardous
waste site." 60
Both the comprehensiveness paradigm and its quantification
corollary can be severely criticized on a number of grounds. Pro-
fessor Lindblom originally explicated the model principally to ar-
gue that it should be replaced because it requires far more infor-
mation and analytical capacity than realistically exists." Professor
McGarity similarly views comprehensive systems as theory unre-
lated to actual practice. 2 And Professors Gillette, Krier, and
Hornstein have developed more fundamental critiques of the
whole idea of quantified risk as the basis for regulatory action.63
For our purposes, however, the rationalist model reinforces the de-
mand for "accuracy" in SARA and further contributes to the ten-
dency to make the NPL an end in itself.
" See Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 292 and sources cited therein.
" See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the -Para-
digms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 376-78
(1993); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comprehensive Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 565 (1992). See also Worst Things
First, supra note 5, at 347-49 (describing the general trend to view quantification as a
means of assuring objectivity).
- CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (i)(6)(f) (1988 & Supp. IV 1988).
"g 53 Fed. Reg. 51962, 51963-64 (1988). See also McElveen, supra note 12, at 73-76
(describing the HRS in terms of the elements of quantitative risk assessment).
"U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. Carlson, 638 F. Supp. 513, 515 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
1 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Mixed Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decisionmak-
ing, 27 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 385, 385-86 (1967); see also Lindblom, supra note 51, at 80, 87.
Diver calls the information needs "ravenous." Diver, supra note 51, at 428.
See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 51, at 1257-58, 1276-84, 1287-92, 1303-08.




The other major reason for the NPL's dysfunction is less a
matter of statutory structure than of judicial reception. The im-
mediate legal reason for the visibility of the NPL and HRS is
that, unlike the rest of the clean-up process, they are subject to
preenforcement judicial review. The fact that listing itself has
negative financial consequences only increases the pressure for re-
view at this point.
1. Statutory Preclusion of Review
Like Conan Doyle's dog in the night-time," one of the most
striking features of the CERCLA process is what is missing from
it. The judicial involvement that is so central to the liability side
of CERCLA and so much a part of most other areas of environ-
mental law is not really part of clean-up decisionmaking. This is
further evidence of the rationalist approach of the NCP, an addi-
tional characteristic of which is broad agency discretion. 5 Discre-
tion elevates the power of the expert agency, resulting in the posi-
tion, either implicit or explicit, that clean-up involves the
resolution of technical issues which judicial involvement does little
to advance.
Before SARA, the availability of preenforcement judicial re-
view was in some dispute. A majority of courts favored delaying
review until actual clean-up efforts were required or liability was
imposed, citing the need for swift, undistracted response action by
[ Inspector Gregory:] "Is there any point to which you would wish to draw
my attention?"
[Holmes:] "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 24 (1894, facsimile ed.
1975) (the tale of Silver Blaze).
6 See, e.g., Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 296-98. The same phenomenon can
be seen in the substance of the NCP. While the 1990 revisions were intended to bring more
structure to the remedy selection, the nine criteria do not create an automatic result at
each site. They are hardly self-explanatory in themselves, and they are often contradictory
among each other (for example, cost versus long-term effectiveness). As a result it is nearly
impossible to exercise judicial control over remedy selection; the court must defer to the
agency. See The 1990 National Contingency Plan, supra note 4, at 2, 20-25. And in case
the point was still unclear, the statute goes out of its way to state explicitly that the court
should be hesitant to overturn the agency's remedy selection. CERCLA § 113(j), 42
U.S.C. § 9613 (j) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992).
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EPA.66 SARA clarified Congress' intention to preclude judicial
review. Under section 113(h), no review of remedy selection may
be obtained until EPA enforces it against a private party, either
through injunctive action or recovery of response costs. Congress
specifically cited the need to avoid the delay and disruption of
early review.
87
2. The Consequences of Preclusion
The late timing of judicial review is a high-risk proposition
for the courts, for EPA, and for the potentially liable parties. It
requires the court to invalidate an extremely lengthy and elabo-
rate decisionmaking process if it is to overturn the decision at all.
From the liable party's point of view, it is very dangerous to wait
to comply until actual costs and/or penalties accrue. 8 Finally,
the late review creates an irresistible additional incentive for the
EPA to spend substantial resources on decisionmaking to avoid
reversal of all of its remedial choices. Into this extremely uncom-
fortable situation, then, comes NPL listing, which being a
rulemaking is open to preenforcement review. 6' It is little wonder
that the NPL gets so much attention.
Once listing decisions were determined to be appropriate sub-
jects of judicial review, it was only a matter of time until listing
" See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); Lone Pine
Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1496-98 (D.N.J. 1985), affid 777 F.2d 882
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
" See S. REP. No. 11. 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 58 (1985). See also HR. REP. No.
253(l). 99TH CONG., 2D SESS. Pt. 1, at 81, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2863; See
also H CONF. REP. No. 962. 99TH CONG., 2D SESS. 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317.
88 See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. USEPA, 812 F.2d 383, 389 (8th Cir. 1987)
(describing this dilemma and upholding its constitutionality). See also ALAN J. TOPOL &
REBECCA SNOW. I SUPERFUND LAW & PROCEDURE § 2.5, at 113-14 (1992) (noting an
"imbalance of power" created by the delayed judicial review). Topol and Snow point out
that preenforcement review would not result in a significant marginal delay in an already
very lengthy process. Id.
SARA expressly restates the burden of proving arbitrary or capricious remedy selec-
tion is on the challenger. CERCLA § 1136)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 113 0)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV
1988). In a procedurally unusual case, the Second Circuit assumed jurisdiction despite
§ 113(h) preclusion to deal with what it found to be the far easier question of rejecting a
challenge to a CERCLA order on the merits. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 113(h)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). It was an easier question, the court said, because courts must be
very deferential in scientific and technical areas. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. EPA, 899
F.2d 151, 160, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1990).
" CERCLA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915-19 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [Eagle-Picher 1].
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became an important locus of litigation, especially since it is one
of the few possible areas of review. The financial consequences of
listing also greatly intensify the pressure for review. While listing
per se has few legal consequences, and none of them immediate, it
has definite short-term and extremely negative economic conse-
quences."' For many sites, the main effect is the "stigma" of haz-
ard.7 1 In fact, one site owner sued EPA not to delist the site but to
rename it to avoid perceived association with it.7" More tangibly,
the chance that a site could be the source of huge liability to its
owner greatly restricts the owner's practical ability to transfer, de-
velop, or borrow against it."5 Listing drastically reduces the value
10 See Kent County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
" See Henrichs, supra note 9, at 750; TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 68, § 2.4, at 92.
But see U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. Carlson, 638 F. Supp. 513, 520 (CD. I11. 1986):
Placement on the NPL does not impart the "negative stigma" claimed by the
plaintiff .... The priority lists serve primarily informational purposes, iden-
tifying for the states and the public those facilties and sites or other releases
which appear to warrant remedial actions. Inclusion of a facility or site on
the list does not require those persons to undertake any action, nor does it
assign liability to any person. Subsequent government action ... will be nec-
essary in order to do so ....
The courts considering early listing challenges decided that there need be no hearing
before listing because judicial review was available after listing. Under the familiar Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing test, the immediate negative effects
of listing were outweighed by the importance of avoiding delay. See, e.g., Bormet Alumi-
num Court v. Thomas, 730 F. Supp. 771, 773 (W.D. Ky. 1990), aff'd 927 F.2d 289 (6th
Cir. 1991); SCA Services of Indiana v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1986);
D'Imperio v. U.S., 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983); cf. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.
v. ATSDR, 763 F. Supp. 1576, 1582-83 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (rejecting Mathews-based due
process challenge because the reputational damage from an ATSDR health assessment was
outweighed by the needs of the agency). These courts also cited the scientific nature of the
decision and the goal of minimizing participation and delay, but it is unclear why these
apply more strongly to the pre-listing period than to the post-listing period, when listing
itself has little immediate significance.
" DImperio, 575 F. Supp. at 253-54 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under CERCLA § I13(a)).
" Daniel R. Hansen, Environmental Regulation and Just Compensation: The Na-
tional Priorities List as a Taking, 2 N.YU. ENVTL L.J. 1, 9-19 (1993) (arguing that,
nevertheless, listing should not be considered a taking); Getting Off EPA's Blacklist: Op-
posing National Priorities List Designations, SONREEL NEws (Section of Natural Re-
sources, Energy, and Environmental Law, American Bar Association) Nov./Dec. 1993, at
4 (asserting that listing has forced some companies to close).
The courts have recognized that the practical consequences of listing are dire. See,
e.g., Kent County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1992); B&B Tritech, Inc. v. EPA,
957 F.2d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Tinkham v. Reagan, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 20553
(D.N.H. 1983) (but finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction to review).
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of the land and may also depress property values around the site. '
The financial impact, in sum, makes listing worth litigating.
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT
A. The Record of Reversals
As several observers have noted,7" the National Priorities List
has recently experienced some rough treatment in the D.C. Cir-
cuit, where all rulemaking review actions must be lodged.76 The
box score on challenges to the listing of specific sites still favors
EPA . EPA's record stands at eight wins, five losses and two ties.7 7
However, the current trend is toward reversals. More impor-
tantly, any reasonable prospect for pinioned site owners to extri-
cate themselves from the NPL must realistically be seen as an
invitation to litigate.
The D.C. Circuit reviews the NPL in two different proce-
dural settings. The first group of cases is preenforcement review of
the NCP itself. These cases do not challenge the listing of a par-
" Janet E. Kohlhase, The Impact of Toxic Waste Sites on Housing Values, 30 J.
URB. ECON. 1, 11-19 (1991) (adjoining property); Nancy A. Mangone, The Effect of
Superfund Site Designation on Property Values - Smuggler Mountain, Aspen, Colorado:
A Case Study, 70 DEN. U. L. REV. 511 (1993).
On the other hand, as Hansen notes, the devaluation may more accurately have been
seen as the reaction to the underlying condition of the property, i.e., contaminated with
hazardous substances. Therefore, it is not the listing per se but the existence of hazardous
wastes that reduces the values. Hansen, supra note 73, at 12.
" See Getting off EPA's Blacklist, supra note 73, at 4; George B. Wyeth, Trends &
Insights: Hazardous Waste, 8 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 46 (Summer 1993).
11 CERCLA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1988). See Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 726 F. Supp. 607, 610-11 (E.D. Pa. 1989); U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. Carl-
son, 638 F. Supp. 513, 518-19 (C.D. I11. 1986).
17 1 classify the cases as follows:
Outright wins: Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [Eagle-
Picher IF]; Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Eagle-Picher 11];
Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988); City of
Stoughton v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Washington State Dep't of Trans. v.
EPA, 917 F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Apache Powder Co. v. USEPA, 968 F.2d 66 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Allied-Signal Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Bradley Mining
Co. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Losses (remand or reversal): Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
[Tex Tin I]; Kent County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Anne Arundel County
v. EPA, 963 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1992); National Gypsum Co. v. EPA, 968 F.2d 40 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 992 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [Tex Tin II].
Draws (EPA wins but with a stern warning against further action): Linemaster
Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991); B&B Tritech, Inc. v. EPA, 957
F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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ticular site, but instead take issue with EPA's announced proce-
dures and criteria for listing all sites. The NCP has sailed through
judicial review with minimal scrutiny and with little of substance
being overturned.7" These cases are studies in the classical justifi-
cations for deference to agency expertise. They emphasize the
complexity of CERCLA and the priority setting process, the legis-
lative commitment of these issues to the EPA, and the need to
resolve technical and often conflicting policies.79 Not surprisingly,
the opinions rely heavily on Chevron80 deference to agency inter-
pretation of the statute. In the most recent case, the court re-
viewed a virtual laundry list of issues and dismissed eighteen (five
on ripeness grounds) out of nineteen separate challenges.
Systemic challenges to the HRS fared no better. Eagle-
Picher I is a model for judicial review of priority setting. It clearly
recognizes the limited purposes of the HRS and its limited regula-
tory consequences.81 The court agreed with EPA that it was en-
tirely proper for EPA to deliberately sacrifice accuracy in what is
essentially a matter of internal management: "The EPA considers
the HRS to be a useful tool for sifting through a large number of
sites in a relatively expeditious and inexpensive manner." 82 It is an
"informational tool," "helpful to the Agency" in deciding which
sites require more careful study.83 On the merits, the court relied
on Chevron and the usual ideas of deference to reasoned adminis-
trative decisionmaking. " A later challenge was met with similar
unwillingness to impose upon the HRS a degree of accuracy be-
yond that necessary for the internal management function.8"
The second group of cases, challenges to individual listing de-
cisions, has met a very different fate. Based on the systemic chal-
78 The major exception is natural resources damages, a part of the NCP which was
worked out between the EPA and the Department of the Interior. The D.C. Circuit found
that the agencies had misinterpreted the law in permitting recovery only of the "lesser of"
the restoration cost or the diminution of use value. See Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880
F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
=" See Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reviewing the 1990 version of
the NCP); Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing the 1985
version of the NCP). An early pair of challenges was compromised by a settlement re-
corded in the Federal Register. See 50 Fed. Reg. 5862 (1985).
"' Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81 Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 909-11, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
03 Id. at 919 (emphasis supplied).
80 Id. at 919-20.
4 Id. at 920-22.
85 Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1303-05 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per-
mitting use of old HRS after date that revisions were to be in place).
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lenges, one would have expected the kind of response that an early
listing challenge received in Eagle-Picher II:
The NPL is simply the first step in a process - nothing more,
nothing less .... [w]e must keep firmly in mind the modest and
limited purposes of the list. In our view, it is well within EPA's
discretion to decide that, for a determination of "imminent and
substantial danger" at a site to have any degree of reliability,
that assessment would have to be based upon a more detailed,
complex and thus rather expensive study all out of proportion to
the limited, threshold-like goals of the NPL.88
Other early cases upheld individual listings and emphasized the
intended quickness and inexpensiveness of the NPL and HRS pro-
cess. The NPL is a measure of relative and not absolute risk. It is
used for informational and not remedial purposes.87 "It is not nec-
essary that EPA's decisions as to what sites are included on the
NPL be perfect, nor even that they be the best.... Certainly they
may not always be based on the best possible methodology." 88
The same types of challenges to EPA's methodology, to the
accuracy and adequacy of its data, and to its explanation of its
calculations, all of which were uniformly rejected through 1990,
began to find success in 1991. 1992 was the "annus horribilis" for
both Queen Elizabeth8" and the National Priorities List. The
court's justification for reversal was in most cases EPA's asserted
failure to explain its actions. In some cases, there were inconsis-
tencies in methodological policies; 0 in others, EPA made assump-
tions that seemed to defy common sense.8 ' In National Gypsum,
Judge Mikva angrily began with the accusation that in "yet an-
other case . . . EPA seems unwilling to support its decisions with
the necessary scientific findings." 9
8 Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
See, e.g., City of Stoughton v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747, 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Eagle-Picher Ind. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
88 City of Stoughton, 858 F.2d at 755-56 (the EPA need not make a "house-by-
house" determination).
"' See Nadine Brozan, Chronicle, N.Y TIMES, November 25, 1992, p. B4 (final ed.).
Her Majesty was referring, of course, to the fire at Windsor Castle and her children's love
lives.
9. See, e.g., Kent County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Anne Arundel
County v. USEPA, 963 F.2d 412, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
" See, e.g., B&B Tritech Inc. v. EPA, 957 F.2d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(reluc-
tantly permitting EPA to base groundwater exposure on an unused aquifer); Tex Tin Corp.
v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1331, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
92 National Gypsum Co. v. EPA, 968 F.2d 40, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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While these later cases pay lip service to the necessary inac-
curacy of the HRS, opinions like National Gypsum clearly de-
mand additional scientific support from EPA in the form of more
testing, analysis, and other data gathering,93 despite earlier affir-
mations that the HRS is not to be informationally taxing.9' In
Tex Tin II the court concluded that EPA's inference of airborne
exposure to arsenic in tin slag was simply wrong.9 5 While these
conclusions are couched in the appropriately deferential language
of merely requiring explanation," it is hard to escape the conclu-
sion that they represent precisely the kind of substantive judicial
involvement to which commentators have attributed much admin-
istrative timidity. 7 Moreover, in B&B Tritech, the court, despite
upholding the listing, worried: "The record does not disclose
whether the B&B site poses any real risk to the public, because
EPA did not address that question."99 The court's concern in B&B
Tritech completely misses the point of the HRS, which was ex-
plained so eloquently a year earlier by the same court: The HRS
is not the definitive statement on the need for actual remediation
to prevent health risks, but rather is an initial screening phase.
The court, it seems, forgot in the listing challenges what it had
said in the systemic challenges to the NCP and HRS.
B. The Effects of the Reversals
On their own terms, the reversal cases are open to criticism
as judicial overreaching and as inconsistent with the minimal-
scrutiny approach to the systemic review cases. Of considerably
greater concern are the implications of these reversals for the
functioning of the overall clean-up process. They undermine a val-
uable attempt to allocate environmental resources rationally.
None of the identified purposes of the NPL demands more than
approximate accuracy, or requires large amounts of supporting
data. The NPL should be a tool of internal management, hence
'" Id. at 46-47; accord Kent County, 963 F.2d at 392 ("The agency does not plausibly
contend that performing both tests [it had performed only one of the pair] would be too
burdensome, economically or otherwise.").
See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Ind. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
" Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 992 F.2d 353, 355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
ou See Wyeth, supra note 75, at 47.
'7 See MeGarity, supra note 55, at 1387-1396. As McGarity also points out, the legal
basis of the initial demand for detailed explanation is uncertain at best. Id. at 1444.
" B&B Tritech v. EPA, 957 F.2d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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relatively speedy and inexpensive, and not a major outlet for sub-
stantive judicial review. As the D.C. Circuit at one time recog-
nized,99 the NPL is not "definitive," it is not a final or even tenta-
tive decision on remediation, and it does not purport to identify
"the most hazardous sites." As an initial screening device with
few regulatory consequences, absolute accuracy is of minimal con-
cern since errors can be corrected later. Even the detailed priority
setting function should not be a major source of information de-
mands.100 Finally, the public information function at best gives
only the most general notice of the existence of a site of concern.
Within the priority-setting phase of the regulatory process,
the court incorrectly focused intensive review on individual listing
decisions. The D.C. Circuit paid little attention to the NCP and
HRS and yet proceeded to attack their results. More careful at-
tention should be paid to the priority setting system itself (specifi-
cally, the HRS and NCP) and less to the choices made by the
system concerning individual listings, if the system is to work effi-
ciently.'01 A major justification for preenforcement review, and
one that the court expressly relied on in the systemic HRS chal-
lenge, is avoidance of piecemeal litigation over a general rule
through numerous cases of individual application. 02  General
rules such as the HRS often apply imperfectly in individual cases,
but this imperfection is an expected and worthwhile price for the
fairness and efficiency that generality can achieve.' 03
As a result of the reversals, the practicing bar has recognized
a legitimate opportunity to avoid the dire practical consequences
of listing. Such litigation, however, makes priority setting any-
thing but speedy and inexpensive. For example, two litigators cor-
rectly advise, given the case law, that "challenging NPL listings
involves relatively little 'big picture' analyses and requires minute
focus on details," since error in just one of many "sub-decisions"
in the HRS can result in remand or reversal.104 Even when the
9 Eagle-Picher Ind. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
1o See Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 324-28. The functions of the NPL are
discussed, supra at text accompanying notes 40-42.
101 See Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 309-10, 348-49 (advocating "directed
priority setting").
1"2 See Eagle-Picher 1, 759 F.2d at 915-19. The seminal case making this argument is
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
103 Judge Posner elegantly explained this trade-off in American Hospital Ass'n v.
NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990). aftid, 111 S.Ct. 1539 (1991).
'o' Getting Off EPA's Blacklist, supra note 73, at 5-6.
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court upholds a listing, the EPA must have carefully justified each
sub-decision and the court must elaborately analyze the conflict-
ing claims regarding each decision."' This result is completely at
odds with the comprehensive ordering which was intended by the
drafters of the NPL.
Perhaps the most insidious effect of the reversals is to exacer-
bate, and indeed legitimate, the bureaucratic tendency to treat the
NPL as an end in itself. This tendency is created by the elaborate
administrative process established in the NCP, the detail in the
statute itself, the need for short-term benchmarks of bureaucratic
accomplishment, the ethos of quantification embodied in the HRS,
and the existence of preenforcement judicial review which is un-
available elsewhere in the process. When listing decisions are re-
peatedly remanded, the cautious regulator can only conclude that
the NPL is an end in itself, and a major source of occupational
embarrassment.10 When listing is a source of judicial rebuke, the
court is also making this early phase of the decisionmaking pro-
cess an end in itself, and even the most intrepid administrator
would be foolish to treat it otherwise. To the extent that the rest
of the decisionmaking process (in particular remedy selection) has
become an inflexible maze of many steps, each treated as an end
in itself, 10 7 the cumulative effect of the reversals at the earliest
stages is disastrous. Critical judicial review of a relatively minor
phase in the process thus exacerbates the problems of delay and
bureaucratic rigidity.
III. RESOLVING THE LISTING IMPASSE
A. In Theory
As shown in Part I, the NPL and HRS exemplify the com-
prehensive rationalistic approach of the regulatory side of CER-
CLA. A resolution of the NPL and HRS problem might be found
by taking the opposite approach, incrementalism. An incremental
system makes decisions through continuous small adjustments. It
is remedial and piecemeal but it can also be dynamic and flexi-
"06 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring nearly
20 pages in the Federal Reporter).
100 See McGarity, supra note 55, at 1410-26 (providing numerous examples of the
chilling effect of intrusive judicial review on agency activity).
107 This is a frequent criticism of the Superfund program. See, e.g., Hansen, supra
note 73, at 1-2.
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ble. 1°8 Moreover, instead of demanding more and more new data,
incrementalism makes the maximum use of existing knowledge,
because it relies on small departures from the status quo."0 9
Professor Diver has pointed out that there are certain circum-
stances under which the incremental approach is distinctly prefer-
able. These circumstances include: (1) when the agency must ac-
commodate conflicting values; (2) when relatively little
information is available; (3) when the agency is operating in an
unstable environment; and (4) where the regulatory regime itself
is immature.' t0 These characteristics fairly describe most CER-
CLA remediation decisions. Knowledge of the degree and nature
of contamination, of the capacity of the technologies available to
do the remediation, and of future remedial needs has evolved over
the course of a decades-long clean-up period and such decisions
are probably unsuitable for a final comprehensive solution. Thus,
EPA seems to be considering doing away with the NPL-HRS pro-
cess and replacing it with a region-by-region workplan developed
in coordination with the states."' Presumably, the idea is to re-
place the process-encrusted and highly litigated NPL with a more
informal and politically responsive list."' With a severe scarcity
108 Diver, supra note 51, at 399-401; Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 51, at
79-81.
109 Lindblom, supra note 51, at 85, 87.
110 Diver, supra note 51, at 430-33.The liability side of CERCLA fits this description
rather well, and it seems fair to say that incrementalism has on the whole worked well in
that context. As noted by the court in U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp 802 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) , the statute was vaguely drafted and left much to "common law" development
of a virtually unprecedented regulatory scheme and that is exactly what happened. Issues
such as strict and joint and several liability were decided by a combination of divining
statutory intent, combing legislative history, drawing on statutory analogies, and basic tort
law analysis. For example, the decision to impose joint and several liability was justified by
a close reading of the legislative history to discover that the deletion of a specific reference
to joint and several liability was not intended to be a disapproval of it and by consideration
(taken from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs) of the implications of placing burdens
of proof on indivisible injury.
"' Superfund: Administration Refines Position on Reform; Recommendations Ex-
pected Soon, Sources Say, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1515, 1516 (Dec. 17, 1993); Superfund:
Overhaul of Remedy Selection Process, Some Municipal Liability Sought by EPA, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1228 (Nov. 5, 1993); Superfund: Greater State Role, National Stan-
dards Advocated by EPA, Agency Official Testifies, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1229 (Nov. 5,
1993). A more elaborate proposal would replace the NPL with two lists: each state's priori-
ties list and a National Funding List for orphan (and recalcitrant PRP) sites. Superfund:
NACEPT Panel Offers Position Papers with Draft Options on Superfund Reform, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1132 (Oct. 15, 1993).
II For example, environmental equity concerns could be addressed more easily than
under the current HRS, which has been criticized for failing to take account of environ-
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of resources available for actual clean-up, it seems that resources
devoted to an imprecise and expensively contentious priorities list
could be better spent."'
On the other hand, not all of the virtues of incrementalism
translate directly into the listing process. Priority setting is essen-
tial to any rational regulatory scheme, especially with a statute
displaying such a disparity of goals and resources. Therefore, even
though priority setting is not openly dealt with by statute or regu-
lation, it will have to be done. Lindblom specifically acknowledged
that even in an incremental system an administrator needs "some
direction." '114 Priority setting is an inherently comprehensive
task."" McGarity, despite his skeptical view of the value of elab-
orate analysis, specifically recognizes its value "in setting long-
term priorities.""'  Other scholars, and recently Lindblom himself,
have developed a middle-level approach that combines some broad
thinking at the initial stages, followed by detailed, incremental
analysis at a later point." 7 Solution to the NPL's problems would
seem to be moderation of the NCP's rationalistic approach, along
with recognition that the NPL itself must be treated as strictly
provisional, based on limited information, and for a limited use
only.
B. In Statutory Language
Abolition of the NPL and HRS is throwing the baby out with
the bathwater. The problem with the NPL and HRS is that, like
the RI/FS and other processes, they have become ends in them-
selves and not means to an end. The focus should be on improving
the NPL-HRS process, not dispensing with it. As a first step, list-
ing decisions should be subject to review only for the most egre-
mental equity issues such as cumulative effects with other environmental hazards, history
of community exposure, and prevalent community health and nutritional status. See Com-
munity Groups Demand Health Services, New Site Listing Criteria, Greater Involvement,
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1318 (Nov. 12, 1993).
" See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 68, § 2.4, at 101.
.. Charles E. Lindblom, Contexts for Change and Strategy: A Reply, 24 PuB. AD-
MIN. REV. 157-58 (1964).
"' Adams, supra note 53, at 549-50.
'i THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 162 (1991).
"' See Etzioni, supra note 61, at 388-90; Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not
Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 519 (1979) (advocating careful choice of overall
strategies for dealing with problems).
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gious misconduct, such as not following the HRS at all. Debates
on methodology and data quality must be kept out of the courts.
Of course the data are likely to be insufficient at the listing stage,
but there is no need for a high degree of accuracy. Except at the
cusp of 28.5 HRS points, the sites are dangerous and will be
cleaned up anyway.
Textually, this requires two changes in CERCLA. First, Con-
gress must clarify its attitude toward accuracy. Eagle-Picher I
understood the limited role of the NPL and HRS, but then SARA
added the phrase "to the maximum extent ... accurate" to cover
mining wastes. Congress should delete or qualify this overly broad
language. Second, Congress should adopt a section reviewing indi-
vidual listing decisions, which is similar to the provision for rem-
edy selection, emphasizing the deferential role of the courts.1 18
CONCLUSION
To the extent that judicial review of priority setting is war-
ranted, the HRS and NCP systems should receive the careful at-
tention of the D.C. Circuit. If they are acceptable in terms of the
language and purposes of the statute, then the results of the sys-
tems should be acceptable if they are reasonably closely followed.
It is wholly consistent with a rationalist approach that criteria, a
hierarchy of those criteria, preferences, and parameters should be
established up front as the key determinants of later decisions."'
Systematic review of the HRS and NCP would necessarily be def-
erential because the courts would have few specific facts on which
to base objections, but that is to be expected. Review should be
deferential for an administrative management tool.
The Clinton Administration's Superfund reauthorization
bill 2 ' would accomplish many of these goals. It would remove the
basis for judicial review of NPL listings by allowing listing to be
accomplished "administratively, and without rulemaking" 2 1 and
118 Cf. McGarity, supra note 55, at 1453-54 (suggesting the adoption of statutory
language to clarify deferential review).
"I Cf. Worst Things First, supra note 5, at 347-49 (viewing the NPL and HRS as
directed priority setting).
"0' H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
131 H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §206(a) (amending CERCLA §105(a)(8)(B)).
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by substituting public and state involvement for judicial
involvement."'
Finally, to relieve pressure on listing decisions as an outlet for
judicial review, Congress should improve public participation, and
perhaps permit preenforcement judicial review of remedy selec-
tion. 25 This recommendation raises issues well beyond the scope
of this Article, but it also serves as a reminder that the source of
the problem with the NPL is that it is an overly litigated part of a
larger decisionmaking system. The solution lies in the recognition
that the regulatory side of the CERCLA system must be
reformed.
1' H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 206(b), 207 (adding CERCLA
§105(a)(C)(D)).
123 Suggestions of this nature are made in CLEAN SITES, supra note 54. and TOPOL &
SNOW, supra note 68, at 113-14.
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